24Every, part of the executive power conferred on the President by Article II(1) is a power to manage external relations. The Garamendi tribunal raised a legitimate question about whether respect for the executive power of foreign relations requires a categorical choice between the opposing theories of reception on the ground and conflicts, which are evident in Zschernig`s positions. Instead, Judge Souter proposed to the Court of Justice that a pre-emption procedure on the ground might be appropriate if a State legislates for the sole purpose of adopting a position on a foreign policy issue, without seriously claiming to deal with traditional State responsibility, and conflict prevention may be appropriate where a State legislates in an area of traditional responsibility, 25Footnote539 U.S. at 419 n.11. We have to wait for further litigation to see if the court applies this distinction.26Notation of Justice Ginsburg`s dissent in Garamendi, joined by the other three judges, proposed to limit Zschernig in a manner generally consistent with Justice Souter`s distinction. According to Justice Ginsburg, Zschernig`s pre-emption measure is most audible when a state act “reflects a critical state policy toward foreign governments and pronounces them in a judgment against them.” 539 U.S. to 439 (Henkin city, above, 164). But Justice Ginsburg also expressed broader concerns about judges becoming discoverers of the nation`s foreign policy. See in this context Goldsmith, above, in 1631, who describes Zschernig`s right of pre-emption as a form of federal customary law of foreign relations. .